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89 
Improper Application of First-Amendment Scrutiny to 
Conduct-Based Public Nudity Laws: City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M. Perpetuates the Confusion Created by Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme Court 
was asked to decide whether the First Amendment protected the owners 
of two nude dancing establishments from an Indiana state law that 
banned public nudity. The Indiana law required that dancers wear, at a 
minimum, “pasties” and “G-strings” when they danced. The Barnes 
Court upheld the statute, but was unable to support its decision with a 
majority of the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion 
by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. Rehnquist’s opinion was 
outnumbered by four dissenters, Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens. However, two concurrences, one by Justice Souter and one 
by Justice Scalia, upheld the outcome. As a result of the fragmented 
decision, jurists and state and local legislators had no clear rule to rely 
upon. 
Both the Erie, Pennsylvania city council and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court tried to extract a rule from Barnes’s three opinions 
supporting the outcome but focused on very different language and came 
to two significantly different conclusions. In September of 1994, just 
three years after Barnes was decided, the Erie city council passed an 
ordinance that made appearing in public in “a state of nudity” a summary 
offense. The Erie ordinance was patterned after Indiana’s statute, and 
indeed was almost identical to it in every way2 except for a preamble that 
soon became the center of a heated dispute.3 
 
 1. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 2. The Indiana Statute that was discussed in Barnes, section 35-45-4-1 of the 1988 Indiana 
Code, provides in pertinent part: 
Public indecency; Indecent exposure 
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place: 
(1) engages in sexual intercourse; 
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct; 
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or 
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; 
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor. . . . 
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Pointing to this preamble, which named the negative effects of an 
increase in “nude live entertainment” as one motivation for the passage 
of the ordinance,4 Pap’s A.M., a Pennsylvania corporation that operated a 
strip club called “Kandyland,” sought an injunction against the City of 
Erie, arguing that the ordinance violated the First Amendment’s 
guarantees of freedom of speech and expression. Because of Barnes’s 
numerous overlapping opinions, the Pennsylvania state courts struggled 
to determine what standard should be applied. 
The Court of Common Pleas for Erie County initially granted a 
permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, which it held 
to be unconstitutional.5 On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed 
and the order was repealed.6 Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted review of the case and again reversed in an opinion that 
dismissed the Barnes decision due to the fact that Barnes was a plurality 
decision that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court felt was without 
precedential value.7 Undertaking its own First-Amendment analysis, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “concluded that although one of the 
 
(b) “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or 
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with 
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered 
male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. 
Erie City Ordinance 75-1994 provides in relevant part: 
(A). A person who knowingly or intentionally does any of the following, in a public 
place: commits public indecency, a summary offense: 
1. Engages in sexual intercourse 
2. Engages in deviate sexual intercourse as defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code 
3. Appears in a state of nudity, or 
4. Fondles the genitals of himself, herself or another person. 
2. “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genital [sic], pubic area or 
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering; the showing of the female breast with 
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple; the exposure of any device, 
costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or simulates the genitals; . . . or the 
exposure of any device worn as a cover over the nipples . . . which device[] . . . gives the 
realistic appearance of nipples and/or areola. 
 3. The preamble to Ordinance 75-1994 states that the City Council chose to adopt the 
ordinance 
for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City, 
which activity adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and 
welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public 
intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other 
deleterious effects. 
ERIE, PA., Codified Ordinances of the City of Erie, Article 711 (1994). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 337, 356 (1995), rev’d, 674 A.2d 338 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1996), rev’d, 719 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 6. Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 674 A.2d 338, 348 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), rev’d, 719 A.2d 
273 (Pa. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 7. Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 278-79 (Pa. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
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purposes of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects,”8 it 
had as its primary target “‘an unmentioned purpose . . . to impact 
negatively on the erotic message of the dance.’”9 The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court therefore held that the Erie ordinance violated the First 
Amendment rights of strip club owners and dancers and that the 
ordinance should be struck down. 
Finally the case reached the United States Supreme Court on a writ 
of certiorari and was once more reversed. Justice O’Connor wrote for the 
Court and upheld the Erie ordinance. In deciding the case, the Court 
applied the same four-part test from United States v. O’Brien10 that it had 
applied in Barnes v. Glen Theatre. In so doing, the Court again failed to 
gather a majority in favor of its decision, thus failing for a second time to 
establish a definitive rule or provide any guidance for local legislators 
and lower court judges with regard to the issue of public nudity statutes. 
It is the position of this note that public nudity laws, such as the ones 
at issue in Barnes and City of Erie, are conduct-based laws that should be 
weighed against the traditional rational basis standard that applies to 
valid exercises of state police power. Although the act of appearing nude 
in public, like any other form of conduct, can be used as a means of 
expression, these laws are general bans on all public nudity, for whatever 
reason, and they do not directly regulate expression. Appearing nude is 
an act of physical conduct, and because the power to police conduct was 
reserved to the states in the absence of some clear constitutional 
protection, public nudity laws should not be subjected to federal 
constitutional scrutiny. It is here further asserted that the Court failed for 
a second time in City of Erie to provide a clear rule on the issue of public 
nudity laws because the Court continued to rely on the mistaken notion 
that some First-Amendment analysis must be applied to such public 
nudity statutes. 
As pointed out above, the statutes at issue in these cases were drafted 
with a primary focus on regulating conduct, not expression, and are 
general in their scope. Thus they should be weighed against the 
traditional power and duty of government to prohibit immoral and anti-
social conduct that tears at the fabric of a modern society. Applying this 
reasoning, which Justice Scalia proposed in his concurring opinions to 
both Barnes and City of Erie, would recognize the fact that the immoral 
act of appearing nude in public can and should be prohibited, and that 
any erotic message a strip-tease dance is intended to communicate can be 
just as adequately conveyed in a state of near-nudity. 
 
 8. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 at 286 (2000). 
 9. Id. (quoting City of Erie, 719 A.2d at 279). 
 10. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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Establishing this rule would provide some much-needed guidance to 
local legislators, allowing them to confidently enact similar ordinances, 
free up judicial resources, and put the issue to rest once and for all. While 
a majority adoption of the countervailing viewpoint, which has been ably 
advocated by Justice O’Connor in both Barnes and City of Erie, could 
also provide such guidance to local legislators, it requires a much more 
cumbersome and complicated analysis. For this reason, the view 
advocated by Justice Scalia and this paper provides the best means of 
closing this long-standing argument and providing a predictable and 
easily applicable means of reaching the same result the Court has 
reached in its two forays into the area of public nudity laws. 
Although it is the primary assertion of this note that public nudity 
laws such as the ones at issue in Barnes and City of Erie should not be 
subjected to First-Amendment scrutiny, some other key First-
Amendment cases will be discussed for the sake of contrast. Section II of 
the note will analyze the Barnes decision and the deficiencies and 
questions left open by the Court’s opinion, as well as the solution offered 
by Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion. Section III will then move on to a 
discussion of the confusion that followed the Barnes decision because of 
the improper focus of the Court’s opinion. Section IV will discuss the 
United States Supreme Court opinions from City of Erie, with a focus on 
the recurring themes in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinions from Barnes 
and City of Erie. Finally, Section V will propose a more definitive rule, 
based primarily upon Justice Scalia’s reasoning and in keeping with the 
ultimate holdings of both cases, which would provide the final resolution 
that is needed in this debate and the guidance local and state legislators 
need in order to adequately address this issue in the future. A brief 
conclusion will follow. 
II.  BARNES V. GLEN THEATRE, INC. 
A.  Facts 
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, the owners of two South Bend, Indiana 
nude dancing establishments brought suit to enjoin enforcement of an 
Indiana anti-nudity statute.11 The United States Supreme Court upheld 
the statute in a fragmented plurality decision. The Court came to the 
questionable conclusion that nude dancing qualifies as “expressive 
conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,”12 and the 
 
 11. 501 U.S. at 562-63. 
 12. Id. at 566. 
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Court’s analysis proceeded to follow the four-step test for evaluating 
symbolic speech, which was set forth in United States v. O’Brien.13 
B.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Opinion for the Court 
1.  Previous nude dancing cases 
The Chief Justice’s opinion took its first wrong turn when it entered 
a brief discussion of earlier nudity cases that included veiled references 
to the First Amendment. Cases such as California v. LaRue,14 Doran v. 
Salem Inn, Inc.,15 and Schad v. Mount Ephraim,16 were cited for the 
principle that “[a]lthough the customary ‘barroom’ type of nude dancing 
may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression . . . this 
form of entertainment might be entitled to First . . . Amendment 
protection under some circumstances.”17 The Court then concluded, 
without any further inquiry or analysis, that the Court of Appeals was 
correct in finding that nude dancing of the kind discussed in Barnes was 
expressive conduct, although, the Chief Justice qualified this conclusion 
by adding, “we view it as only marginally so.”18 
2.  The O’Brien test 
After reaching the conclusion that the conduct of nude dancing was 
in some measure a form of expression, the Court turned the bulk of its 
attention to determining “the level of protection to be afforded to the 
expressive conduct at issue, and . . . [to] determine whether the Indiana 
statute is an impermissible infringement of that protected activity.”19 It 
did so by applying the O’Brien test, which is a four-step test that was 
developed in 1968 to measure infringements on symbolic speech.20 The 
O’Brien test states that a government regulation is justified if: (1) it is 
within the constitutional power of the government; (2) the statute furthers 
some important governmental interest; (3) the government interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental 
 
 13. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 14. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
 15. 422 U.S. 922 (1975). 
 16. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
 17. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565. 
 18. Id. at 566. 
 19. Id. at 566. 
 20. See U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding conviction under statute prohibiting 
the burning of a draft card despite the defendant’s insistence that the act was performed with the 
intent to convey a message). 
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restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.21 
Based upon its application of the O’Brien test, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Indiana statute. In applying the test’s four elements to this 
statute, the Court pointed out that “the statute’s purpose of protecting 
societal order and morality is clear from its text and history.”22 The Court 
endorsed this purpose as a valid one, noting, “[p]ublic indecency, 
including nudity, was a criminal offense at common law,” and that 
“statutes such as the one before us reflect moral disapproval of people 
appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.”23 
There appeared to be no dispute among the Court that the Indiana 
statute’s attempt to address these concerns was a valid exercise of state 
police power and was thereby justified. Had the analysis stopped there, 
the Court would have set forth the clear rule that was so sorely needed. 
However, the Court’s analysis was not that simple, because the 
justification of Indiana’s intent to protect “societal order and morality,” 
although valid, was merely one step in a four-part test that the Court 
thrust upon this issue.24 The Court had decided to entertain the free 
speech argument, a mistaken application that would continue to cloud the 
public nudity issue for the next ten years and beyond. 
3.  The power to provide for public health, safety, and morals 
As was pointed out above, the plurality opinion written by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist applied the more straightforward police-powers 
analysis to the Indiana indecency statute. The police powers analysis 
involves a simple weighing of government interests against the right to 
engage in the conduct being regulated. The problem with this analysis 
was that Rehnquist chose to apply it as merely one factor of the First 
Amendment O’Brien test, rather than recognizing that the case involved 
regulation of conduct and not expression. 
The Chief Justice made many valid points with regard to the police 
powers element. He pointed out that “[t]he traditional police power of the 
States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, 
and morals,” and that the Court had previously “upheld such a basis for 
legislation.”25 Why Rehnquist chose not to rely on the police powers 
principle alone is not clear. The Court must have foreseen that 
introducing a First Amendment analysis would complicate this already 
 
 21. Id. at 376-77. 
 22. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 567-68. 
 25. Id. at 569. 
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heated issue. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, was critical of the 
decision to implicate the First Amendment, and chose to rely on the basic 
principles that Chief Justice Rehnquist had already set forth. 
Scalia’s criticism was justified, given the added confusion and 
complication of the test that was established by the Court’s opinion. 
Again, Rehnquist’s reasons for implicating the First Amendment and for 
evaluating these laws based upon their incidental infringement on the 
right of free expression are not entirely clear. It seems that Rehnquist 
chose to examine such potential infringement as a preliminary step 
before upholding laws that could potentially violate the Constitution. 
While this initial investigation was prudent and rational, Rehnquist failed 
to back off of the Constitutional analysis when it became apparent that 
no First-Amendment rights were violated. By refusing to backtrack to 
Scalia’s position, the Court was left with the task of looking for rights 
violations where arguably none existed. 
C.  Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia, who would also later concur in the City of Erie 
opinion, opened his concurring opinion in Barnes by saying, 
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. In 
my view, however, the challenged regulation must be upheld, not 
because it survives some lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, but 
because, as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically 
directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at 
all.26 
What is interesting is that Justice Scalia actually made many of the 
same points that the Chief Justice had made in his plurality opinion. The 
difference between the two opinions was not really in their ultimate 
reasoning in deciding the case; the difference was that Justice Scalia 
made a point of renouncing the theory that the Indiana statute was in 
some way tied to expression and thus to the First Amendment. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist had not been so careful. Rehnquist had recognized that 
“[p]ublic nudity is the evil the State seeks to prevent, whether or not it is 
combined with expressive activity,”27 but then clouded the true issue in 
his next sentence: “This conclusion is buttressed by a reference to the 
facts of O’Brien.”28 In fact, what the Chief Justice was doing was not 
buttressing his conclusion, but instead opening the door to a continuing 
debate. 
 
 26. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 571. 
 28. Id. 
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Scalia pointed out the very trap that the plurality opinion had fallen 
into when he alluded to the tenuous relationship that any conduct-based 
law has to some form of expression. He said, “virtually every law 
restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed 
for an expressive purpose.”29 While Chief Justice Rehnquist chose to 
entertain and address the First Amendment argument, Justice Scalia 
refused, positing that because the Indiana statute was a general 
prohibition of conduct, “its application to such conduct does not . . . 
implicate the First Amendment.”30 
D.  Where Barnes Came Up Short 
1.  The (limited) precedential value of Barnes’s plurality opinion 
A fragmented, plurality opinion such as the one handed down in 
Barnes creates somewhat of a unique situation with regard to 
precedential value, and this circumstance can often prove quite confusing 
to legislators and lower courts seeking to rely on the opinion. In Marks v. 
United States, 31 the Supreme Court stated, “When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’”32 This “narrowest grounds” approach often leads to 
a great deal of confusion in practice, because one trying to divine a rule 
from the opinion is forced to compare the concurrences and reason out an 
adapted rule based on the varying language used by several Justices. 
Thus, many varying rules may be drawn from the same case. 
The confusion that the “narrowest grounds” rule creates is 
demonstrated by the many cases that addressed the public nudity issue 
following Barnes. In Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron,33 a district 
court attempted to apply the Barnes decision. The court first cited the 
“narrowest grounds” rule from Marks, and then stated, “Our inquiry, 
therefore, focuses on the opinions of the plurality, Justice Scalia and 
Justice Souter.”34 The Tripplett Grille Court continued, 
The plurality view, joined by Justice Souter and all dissenting members 
of the Court, agreed . . . “that nude dancing of the kind sought to be 
 
 29. Id. at 576. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. 
 31. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 32. Id. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
 33. 816 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1993). 
 34. Id. at 1252-53. 
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performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the 
First Amendment, though we view it marginally so.” . . . [while] Justice 
Scalia . . . felt that the statute was “a general law regulating conduct 
and not specifically directed at expression.”35 
After pointing out these differences in agreement, the district court in 
Tripplett Grille concluded that “Justice Souter appears to rule on the 
narrowest grounds,” but then held that the “secondary effects” test, 
which evaluates the government’s need to eradicate the negative societal 
effects that might flow from unregulated expression, was not controlling 
because “Justice Souter injected the secondary effects motive even 
though . . . no prior testimony concerning that issue was offered.”36 The 
district court criticized Souter’s introduction of the “secondary effects” 
test, saying that to “introduce such a phantom motive . . . is 
inappropriate,” and arguing that Justice Souter had introduced the test 
based upon “no factual record.”37 
Another district court, in Nakatomi Investments, Inc. v. City of 
Schenectady,38 more openly rejected Souter’s opinion: “This Court must 
find that Justice Souter’s concurrence did not ‘set forth a subset of 
principles articulated in the plurality opinion’ nor did it articulate a 
common underlying approach that comports with the plurality 
opinion.”39 The Nakatomi Court chose to follow the view of the Eleventh 
Circuit, which had earlier held that “[b]ecause Justice Souter wrote only 
for himself in Barnes, we continue to follow the . . . [earlier] approach of 
gleaning the government interest at stake from the ordinance itself rather 
than implying one where none is evident in the ordinance.”40 Still, 
despite these contrary views, the Seventh Circuit subsequently held that 
“Justice Souter’s concurrence is the controlling opinion on this issue.”41 
This clear split among the circuit and district courts exemplifies the 
 
 35. Id. at 1253. 
 36. Id. at 1254. 
 37. Id. Under the “Secondary Effects” Test, introduced by Justice Souter and applied later by 
Justice O’Connor, the balancing test of the police powers/rational basis test is essentially applied as 
merely one element of a test that evaluates whether an infringement on the right to free speech is 
justified. In essence, an ordinance or statute is allowed to pass First-Amendment scrutiny if it can be 
shown to further the important governmental purpose of fighting some “Secondary Effects” that will 
likely result from allowing the expression/speech to go unregulated. For in-depth arguments for and 
against the application of this doctrine, see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Conference of Mayors, 
et al., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., et al., (122 S.Ct. 1728 (2002)) (No. 00-799); 
Bryant Paul, et al., Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity 
Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355 
(Spring 2001). 
 38. 949 F. Supp. 988 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 39. Id. at 998 (citation omitted). 
 40. Int’l Eateries of Am., Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1162 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 41. Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 842 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000). 
BROGDON MACRO 2/8/2003  11:21 AM 
98 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
confusion that was created by the plurality decision in Barnes. Thus the 
strength of Justice Souter’s opinion, even if it were to be considered 
controlling, was open to challenge in the courts. 
2.  Other responses to Barnes 
Barnes’s confusing holding and the decision by the Barnes Court to 
implicate the First Amendment caused, among other things, the spread of 
a great deal of misinformation, an effect that would later be compounded 
by the City of Erie decision. A quick search of the Internet yields 
thousands of quotes by strippers and strip-club owners who, without any 
actual education on the subject, now readily point to the First 
Amendment as their guardian.42 For example, Virginia Vitzthum, in an 
editorial on the nude dancing issue, refers to “the First Amendment 
protection of ‘expressive conduct.’”43 Since no part of the United States 
Constitution refers to “expressive conduct,” it is not clear why Vitzthum 
chose to use quotation marks in this reference. 
Perhaps the most telling example of the misunderstanding created by 
the Barnes Court’s decision to entertain a First Amendment discussion 
and of the perpetuation of that misunderstanding nine years later by City 
of Erie is drawn from the resultant effect on the city of Erie, 
Pennsylvania, itself. Although Nick Panos, the owner of Pap’s A.M., Inc. 
and “Kandyland,” retired and closed the club before his case even 
reached the United States Supreme Court, he later sold the building to a 
new owner who then opened a similar club. The new club, called 
Kandy’s Dinner Theater, soon featured a sign out front that read “First 
Amendment Rights Headquarters,”44 thus demonstrating an application 
of the Amendment that could most certainly never have been foreseen by 
its framers. 
Another troubling result of the fragmented holding in Barnes has 
been the inability of local and state legislators around the country to rely 
on a clear rule when drafting similar indecency statutes. The scope of 
 
 42. At the time this note was written, a search on google.com using the search terms “strip 
club first amendment” yielded over 21,000 web page results. The links to web pages featuring 
assertions made by strippers and strip club owners who claim the right to First-Amendment 
protection despite an apparent unfamiliarity with the language of the Amendment itself are too 
numerous to list here. 
 43. Virginia Vitzthum, Lighten Up, Sandy Baby, SALON.COM, at http://www.salon.com/ 
health/col/vitz/2000/04/04/nude_dancing/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002). It is important to 
note that Ms. Vitzhum’s article was written in response not only to Barnes, but to the subsequent 
Erie decision as well. This fact merely illustrates, however, the continuing misunderstanding that has 
been perpetuated by these cases. 
 44. Laurie Asseo, Court Limits Nude Dancing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 29, 2001, at 
http://www.abcnews.com/sections/us/Daily News/scotus_nuderuling_000329.html (last visited Oct. 
15, 2002). 
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this problem is demonstrated by taking a quick look at the amicus briefs 
filed in City of Erie. Seeking a final resolution of this issue, numerous 
county and state governments filed briefs in support of the Erie city 
council. Briefs were filed by, among others: Broward County and Orange 
County, Florida; the states of Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Texas; and the commonwealths of Pennsylvania and Virginia. These 
briefs urged the Court to adopt a simpler rational basis standard by which 
to evaluate ordinances and statutes that are general in their scope and 
target only conduct and not expression. Despite this urging, the Court 
failed to seize the second chance it was given in City of Erie to clarify 
this issue and develop a test upon which legislators could rely. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE AND STATE COURT RELIANCE ON BARNES 
A.  The Erie Ordinance 
As was previously pointed out, the language of Erie Ordinance 17-
1994 is virtually identical to Indiana Code § 35-45-4-1, which was 
challenged in Barnes.45 The Erie city council expressly patterned their 
ordinance after the Indiana Statute. After all, the United States Supreme 
Court had approved the Indiana statute just three years earlier. It would 
seem as though the Erie city council should have been able to rely on the 
Barnes precedent for guidance. Unfortunately, however, the problems 
with Barnes’s precedential value, discussed above, posed a great 
problem for local lawmakers. It was very hard to predict how a state or 
federal district court might interpret Barnes if a challenge was brought. 
The Erie ordinance’s preamble presented an additional challenge, 
because it cited an increase in adult entertainment as a motivating factor 
in the law’s passage. 
B.  The Confusion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over the Erie 
Ordinance 
The reaction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the Barnes’s 
precedent echoes that of the federal courts discussed above. Justice 
O’Connor included an extensive description of the treatment the highest 
Pennsylvania court had given to Barnes in her opinion in City of Erie: 
To answer the question whether the ordinance is content based, the 
court turned to our decision in Barnes. Although the Pennsylvania 
 
 45. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560 (1991); see also IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 
(1988), supra, note 2. 
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court noted that the Indiana statute at issue in Barnes “is strikingly 
similar to the Ordinance we are examining,” it concluded that 
“[u]nfortunately for our purposes, the Barnes Court splintered and 
produced four separate, non-harmonious opinions.” After canvassing 
these separate opinions, the Pennsylvania court concluded that, 
although it is permissible to find precedential value in a fragmented 
decision, to do so a majority of the Court must have been in agreement 
on the concept that is deemed to be the holding. . . . Accordingly, the 
court concluded that “no clear precedent arises out of Barnes on the 
issue of whether the [Erie] ordinance . . . passes muster under the First 
Amendment.”46 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s treatment of Barnes 
demonstrated the need for clear precedent on the issue. Here was a state 
court that was faced with a statute identical to one upheld by the highest 
court in the land less than ten years earlier and finding that it had no 
precedent to rely upon! So, when the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, all eyes were fixed on the Court to resolve the matter 
once and for all. Unfortunately, the Court again failed to reach a majority 
opinion. 
IV.  CITY OF ERIE V. PAP’S A.M. AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 
A.  Justice O’Connor’s Opinion for the Court 
1.  Justice O’Connor’s reliance on the Secondary Effects Doctrine 
Charged with writing for the plurality in City of Erie, Justice 
O’Connor chose to rely heavily on the “Secondary Effects” doctrine47 in 
her opinion. Her decision sprung from an initial assumption that nude 
dancing was a First Amendment issue, an assumption that had been made 
without recognizing the distinction between general bans on public 
nudity and bans on nude dancing.48 Proceeding on the assumption that a 
nude dancing ban, rather than a general public nudity ban, was at issue, 
and that such dancing constitutes speech or expression, O’Connor wrote, 
Erie’s asserted interest in combating the negative secondary effects 
associated with adult entertainment establishments like Kandyland is 
unrelated to the suppression of the erotic message conveyed by nude 
dancing. The ordinance prohibiting public nudity is therefore valid if it 
 
 46. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 285 (citations omitted ). 
 47. See supra, note 37. 
 48. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 295-296. 
BROGDON MACRO 2/8/2003  11:21 AM 
89] CITY OF ERIE V. PAP’S A.M. 101 
satisfies the four-factor test from O’Brien for evaluating restrictions on 
symbolic speech.49 
Again, this statement seems to have been based upon the assumption 
that Erie had passed a ban on nude dancing, as the preamble to the 
ordinance might suggest, rather than a ban on all public nudity, which the 
text of the ordinance itself proscribes. Although O’Connor attempted to 
shield the Court’s decision by explaining that the Erie ordinance was 
“unrelated to the suppression” of the expression associated with nude 
dancing, the damage had been done when O’Connor chose to refer to 
nude dancing at all. 
In the wake of City of Erie, a Washington, D.C. strip club owner 
criticized the opinion’s discussion of the secondary effects caused by 
nude dancing, saying, “What crime does it cause? We don’t have any 
drug dealers out front. We don’t have any prostitutes out front.”50 Thus, 
by failing to recognize that the substantive effect of the Erie ordinance, 
rather than the motivation set forth in its preamble, was the real issue to 
be resolved in City of Erie, O’Connor had opened the door to a 
continuation of the misguided discussion over First Amendment 
expression rather than public nudity. But the real problems created by the 
Court’s second plurality decision on the same issue were the questions 
left unanswered for lower courts and state and local governments, which 
had been hopefully anticipating the City of Erie decision as a resolution 
of the confusion left by Barnes. 
2.  Questions still left open by the plurality 
Much like the Barnes decision, City of Erie’s plurality opinion left 
many key issues unresolved, including the question of what precedential 
value City of Erie held. After City of Erie was decided, twenty-two states 
proposed bills that would tighten adult entertainment laws in the year 
2000.51 Because City of Erie failed to focus on the conduct-based nature 
of the Erie ordinance, and instead got bogged down in the O’Brien First-
Amendment analysis, it is unclear whether these laws will face the same 
challenges as those that followed Barnes. “This decision stands 
comfortably on the shoulders of Barnes,” says Pepperdine law professor 
Bernard James.52 But how strong are Barnes’s shoulders? The Barnes 
Court obviously failed to establish a clear precedent; otherwise the Court 
 
 49. Id. at 296. 
 50. Asseo, supra note 43, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Daily News/scotus_nuderuling_ 
000329.html. 
 51. Kelly Anders, X-Rated Regs: Ruling spurs state edicts covering adult businesses, 87 
A.B.A.J. 18 (2001). 
 52. Id. 
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would not have needed to accept a nearly identical case in City of Erie 
and address exactly the same ultimate issues. Other commentators have 
noted that City of Erie follows a line of cases in which, “[u]nwilling to 
appear illiberal, . . . courts have stretched the concept of ‘secondary 
effects’ further and further.”53 One wonders how far the “secondary 
effects” rationale will stretch before it becomes apparent that a First-
Amendment analysis is not the correct means for evaluating these laws. 
B.  Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia drew a clear distinction in his concurring opinion 
between regulations like the Erie ordinance, which is a conduct-based 
regulation that should not be subjected to First-Amendment scrutiny, and 
a content-based regulation of speech.54 Focusing on the language of the 
ordinance, Scalia pointed out its general application and countered the 
assertion that the preamble to the ordinance targets nude dancing. “[T]he 
preamble, the council members’ comments, and the chosen definition of 
the prohibited conduct,” Scalia said, “simply reflect the fact that Erie had 
recently been having a public nudity problem not with streakers, 
sunbathers, or hot-dog vendors, but with lap dancers.”55 Scalia drove this 
distinction home with the closing sentence of his opinion: “The 
traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), 
and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to 
endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been 
repealed by the First Amendment.”56 While Scalia refers to nude dancing 
in his closing, and asserts that his decision would come out the same if 
the ordinance were targeted specifically at nude dancing, the message he 
is sending is clear. Nudity is conduct, and despite specific instances in 
which any conduct can be engaged in to prove a point, conduct generally 
does not equal speech.  
 
 53. Dennis Saffran & David Castro, Soundings: Cities Can Fight Sleaze, CITY J. (Spring 
2000), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_2_soundings.html. 
 54. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 307-308. 
 55. Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 310. 
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V.  ABANDONING THE FIRST-AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
A.  Public Nudity Statutes as a Bar on Conduct Rather than Expression 
1.  Obscenity and indecency were considered crimes under the old 
common law 
Public nudity and indecency statutes have existed since the very 
origins of the American common law. Originally drafted and enforced in 
England, such statutes took hold throughout the colonies and in all of the 
original states. Frederick Schauer has noted that in the Nineteenth 
Century “[i]t was established that the common law prohibited ‘whatever 
outrages decency and is injurious to public morals,’ and the cases 
interpreted this to included indecent exposure” and other obscene 
actions.57 Such laws were in place throughout the late Nineteenth and 
early Twentieth Centuries, and were considered an entirely appropriate 
use of state police powers. 
In Barnes, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that “[p]ublic 
indecency, including nudity, was a criminal offense at common law,”58 
and cited Winters v. New York,59 for having “recognized the common-
law roots of the offense of ‘gross and open indecency.’”60 The Chief 
Justice even referred to an 1881 Indiana statute that had served as a 
precursor to the modern version.61 The statute read, “[w]hoever, being 
over fourteen years of age, makes an indecent exposure of his person in a 
public place . . . is guilty of public indecency.”62 
With such a historical precedent for laws such as those at issue in 
recent cases, and with the long-established police powers justification for 
such laws, one might wonder how the Court came to apply a First 
Amendment standard to these apparently conduct-based laws. The 
answer lies in the modern concern that laws such as these public 
indecency laws might be targeted not only at general conduct alone but 
also at acts that incorporate conduct along with speech or expression. 
 
 57. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, 11 (The Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., 1976) (quoting State v. Rose, 32 Mo. 560 (1862); citing State v. Hazle, 20 Ark. 156 (1859); 
Comm. v. Haynes, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 72 (1854); State v. Roper, 18 N.C. 208 (1835); Miller v. 
People, 5 Barb. 203 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); Britain v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Humph.) 203 (1842)). 
 58. 501 U.S. at 568. 
 59. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
 60. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568 (quoting Winters, 333 U.S. at 515). 
 61. Id. 
 62. 1881 IND. ACTS, ch. 37, § 90. 
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2.  Statutes like those in Barnes and City of Erie are general conduct-
based prohibitions 
Neither of the statutes that were attacked in Barnes and City of Erie 
were directed in any way at expression; both laws continued the long-
accepted common law tradition of enacting general prohibitions on 
public indecency under the authority of state police powers to regulate 
health, morality, and public standards of conduct. The nearly identical 
language of both statutes contains the general provision that “a person 
who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place . . . appears in a state of 
nudity” violates the statutes’ provisions.63 Much attention was paid to the 
preamble to the Erie ordinance, and the private petitioners argued that the 
language of the preamble made the ordinance no longer a generally 
applicable prohibition. The Preamble to the Erie ordinance intimated that 
the Erie city council chose to pass the ordinance in part, 
for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment 
within the City, which activity adversely impacts and threatens to 
impact the public health, safety and welfare by providing an 
atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public 
intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases 
and other deleterious effects.64 
Despite this pointed language, which Justice Stevens’s dissent 
argued was indicative of an intent to suppress expression, Justice 
O’Connor made clear that “[the] Court will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statue on the basis of an alleged illicit motive.”65 When she 
went on to add that “Erie’s asserted interest in combating the negative 
secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments . . .  
is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic message conveyed by nude 
dancing,”66 however, O’Connor confused the motivation for passage of 
Erie’s ordinance with the object of its drafting. Although the preamble to 
the ordinance cited an increase in adult entertainment as a reason for 
passage of the law, the language of the law itself enacts a general ban on 
all public nudity. Thus Erie passed a law that combats the negative 
effects of public nudity in general, not a narrow law that would only 
regulate adult entertainment in an effort to curb its negative effects. 
 
 63. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988); ERIE, PA., Codified Ordinances of the City of Erie, 
Article 711 (1994). 
 64. ERIE, PA. Codified Ordinances of the City of Erie, Article 711 (1994). 
 65. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 292. 
 66. Id. at 296. 
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Justice Scalia’s concurrence went one step further toward 
recognizing that the Erie ordinance was a general anti-nudity law: 
The facts that a preamble to the ordinance explains that its purpose, in 
part, is to “limit a recent increase in nude live entertainment that city 
council members in supporting the ordinance commented to that effect, 
and that the ordinance includes in the definition of nudity the exposure 
of devices simulating that condition neither make the law any less 
general in its reach nor demonstrate that what the municipal authorities 
really find objectionable is expression rather than public nakedness . . . 
[T]he preamble, the council members’ comments, and the chosen 
definition of the prohibited conduct simply reflect the fact that Erie had 
recently been having a public nudity problem not with streakers, 
sunbathers, or hot-dog vendors, but with lap dancers.67 
Six Justices agreed that the provisions of the Erie ordinance were general 
in their scope and created an across-the-board ban on any nudity in 
public, and Justice O’Connor even noted in her opinion that “there is 
nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to ban 
public nudity.”68 Nonetheless, the plurality still was unwilling to uphold 
the statute without a First Amendment analysis of the effect on 
expression. Or perhaps the Justices had become conditioned to assume 
that the First Amendment is implicated in almost any form of regulation 
pertaining to adult entertainment. In any event, the argument persists that 
nude dancing is somehow inextricably tied to expression. Proponents of 
this argument fail to establish a valid connection between nudity and the 
intended expression and also fail to show any causal link between the 
prohibition of nudity and any adverse effect on such expression. 
Although the distinction between a ban on nudity and a ban on nude 
dancing may seem subtle, it is in fact of paramount importance. If the 
discussion were over a law that regulates nude dancing, there may well 
be First-Amendment implications that would justify looking at secondary 
effects and then applying the complicated O’Brien test. If however, a law 
is general in its application and regulates conduct in all contexts, the 
justification for the law under the police powers must merely be weighed 
against any infringement on individual freedoms generally. While the 
Erie City Council may have been imprudent in choosing to include the 
language of the preamble to the Erie Ordinance, they did not in any way 
alter the working language of the statute as it had been written by the 
Indiana Legislature, and the ordinance was therefore a law of general 
 
 67. Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 295. 
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application to all kinds of unacceptable conduct – that is, public nudity in 
general.69 
B.  The Communicative Character of Nude Dancing 
Judge Richard Posner, in his concurring opinion in Miller v. Civil 
City of South Bend,70 may have offered the best definition of the message 
a strip-tease dancer intends to send to her audience: 
The goal of the striptease – a goal to which the dancing is indispensable 
– is to enforce the association: to make plain that the performer is not 
removing her clothes because she is about to take a bath or change into 
another set of clothes or undergo a medical examination; to insinuate 
that she is removing them because she is preparing for, thinking about, 
and desiring sex.71 
This message referred to by Judge Posner is one that can just as 
easily be conveyed without the dancer reaching a state of complete 
nudity. As Justice Rehnquist aptly noted in Barnes, “the requirement that 
dancers don pasties and G-strings does not deprive the dance of whatever 
erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less 
graphic.”72 The American Civil Liberties Union, which filed a brief as 
Amici Curiae in City of Erie, asserted in its brief that, “laws that have the 
effect of burdening expressive activities must be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny,” and that this law “expressly states that it is regulating conduct 
for the purpose of prohibiting a category of speech.”73 The ACLU’s first 
assertion, that this law in some way burdened the expressive character of 
the dance, is disputable. The second assertion by the ACLU, that the 
purpose of the Erie ordinance was to prohibit speech, was expressly 
rejected by the Court when it held that the preamble to the Erie ordinance 
did not change the general character of the ordinance’s prohibition of 
nudity. Further, the very characterization of nude dancing as a form of 
speech is a questionable one.74 
 
 69. See infra, notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
 70. 904 F.2d 1081, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 71. Id. at 1091-92. 
 72. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571. 
 73. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, at 3-4, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. 277 (2000) (No. 98-1161). 
 74. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS, 45-46 (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 1999) (“How far one should go in characterizing various forms of conduct as 
equivalent to speech involves a subtle judgment of degree, and there is an unfortunate, significant 
risk of hoax in the argument for protection of expressive conduct. If nude dancing on the stage can 
be characterized as behaviour protected by the principle of freedom of expression, then why not 
social dancing or nude bathing? And why not roller-skating? . . . [A]dmittedly, the line will often be 
difficult to draw. This is partly because, in a trivial sense, every human action is ‘communicative’ or 
‘expressive’ in the sense that it ‘communicates’ to other people something about the agent.”). 
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Perhaps more importantly, however, the ACLU and the respondents 
in City of Erie refer often to a so-called suppression of a right to 
expression, but fail to ever point to any specific way in which the 
expressive character of the nude dancing was affected. Not only do they 
provide no specific assertion of suppression nor any allegation of 
causation, but in an effort to refute the applicability of the secondary-
effects doctrine, the ACLU admits in its brief that like nude dancing, 
“dancing with ‘a scant amount of clothing’ . . . also conveys an erotic 
message (albeit somewhat muted in comparison to totally nude 
dancing).”75 Although it is not clear what is meant by the ACLU’s 
assertion that the message is “muted,” it is clear that a dancer in a state of 
near-nudity can convey precisely the same message as a totally nude 
dancer. If there is any difference between the more graphic message a 
stripper is able to convey without any clothing and that she conveys with 
the bare minimum, or if her message is in any way “muted,” by the 
requirement that she wear pasties and a G-string, the difference and 
effect is slight. When one applies the traditional balancing test between 
this slight effect on individual rights76 and police power of the states to 
enact regulations that protect public health, safety, and morality, it is 
clear that the scales tip in favor of the police powers. 
Furthermore, while the act of appearing nude in public arguably 
communicates a message to those in the presence of the naked person in 
the narrow context of nude dancing cases such as Barnes and City of 
Erie, the nearly identical laws that were disputed in each of these cases, 
as noted above, used broad, inclusive language to ban all public nudity. 
Of all the instances of public nudity that would be subject to prosecution 
under these bans, relatively few could potentially rise to the level of 
expression. Thus it would be inappropriate to evaluate the effect of such 
laws, which are predominantly aimed at nude sunbathing, streaking, and 
other indecent exposure in public places, against a constitutional standard 
merely because some small percentage of the conduct that is being 
regulated was entered into for the purpose of expressing a viewpoint or 
message that is of questionable social value. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court chose in Erie to ignore its own 
earlier language recognizing that the ordinance at issue was a ban on all 
public nudity and apply First-Amendment analysis. This leap by the 
 
 75. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, at 15, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. 277 (2000) (No. 98-1161) (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571). 
 76. This reference presumes that an individual has a right to be without clothing, but this is 
not a reference to any enumerated constitutional right that would implicate a higher level of scrutiny. 
As this paper attempts to make clear, the First Amendment refers to “speech,” and merely being 
without clothing in public, the general conduct prohibited by these ordinances, is not speech. 
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Court constituted one of the gravest errors in the progressing debate over 
this issue. Apparently eager to decide the nude dancing issue on First 
Amendment grounds, presumably to provide a clear constitutional 
answer to the question, the Court jumped to the conclusion that 
expression was somehow negatively affected by legislation such as the 
Indiana statute. The Court would later concede the fact that “pasties and 
G-strings [do] not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it 
conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic.”77 The 
damage had been done, however, and this moment of clarity did not undo 
the Court’s decision to open the door to a First-Amendment analysis, a 
mistake that was compounded by the fact that the Court handed down a 
plurality opinion with disputable precedential value. 
C.  The Rational Basis Test and the Right of State Governments to 
Uphold Moral Values as a Valid Exercise of the Police Powers 
Application of the secondary effects doctrine opened the City of Erie 
opinion up to a great deal of criticism it would not have faced had the 
Court not chosen to embark on the more complicated First Amendment 
analysis. The secondary effects doctrine itself has injected much 
unnecessary complication into the decision of otherwise straightforward 
issues. Commentators Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz, and Bradley Shafer, in a 
criticism of the doctrine, have argued, “it is imperative that [the 
application of the secondary effects doctrine] be based on solid evidence 
that the operation of an adult entertainment business has a deleterious 
effect on the surrounding community.”78 Paul, Linz, and Shafer therefore 
propose a four-step test to examine the validity of empirical tests into 
negative effects caused by adult entertainment. This four-step test would 
presumably be used to determine whether the secondary effects 
doctrine’s balancing test should be applied, in order to determine 
whether the four-step O’Brien test should control. Despite the Court’s 
propensity for setting forth balancing tests and prongs, this attempt to 
objectify an otherwise subjective test is not the correct approach. 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurring opinion to City of 
Erie, government has a traditional power and duty “to foster good morals 
(bonos mores),”79 and this police power includes the power to pass 
general prohibitions on conduct that is found unacceptable by society. In 
Barnes, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the Indiana public 
indecency statute “follow[ed] a long line of earlier Indiana statutes 
 
 77. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571. 
 78. Paul et al., supra note 37, at 366. 
 79. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 310. 
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banning all public nudity. The history of Indiana’s public indecency 
statute shows that it predates barroom nude dancing and was enacted as a 
general prohibition . . . [a]s early as 1831.”80 The Chief Justice continued 
by noting that “[t]his and other public indecency statutes were designed 
to protect morals and public order. The traditional police power of the 
States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, 
and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation.”81 Public 
nudity was a criminal offense at common law, and was considered a 
crime malum in se.82 At least forty-seven states have public indecency 
laws of some type.83 And in fact all laws that regulate or prohibit any 
type of conduct are ultimately based upon a moral choice made by 
society or the government that represents it. Similarly, as pointed out 
above, all conduct is ultimately engaged in for some expressive purpose, 
if nothing more than to show that the actor desires to engage in that 
conduct. 
As has been exemplified by the passages above and the many cases 
in which rational basis review has been employed to balance individual 
rights against the need for regulation, state and local governments have a 
valid right to prohibit public nudity if society at large dictates that such 
behavior is unacceptable. This basic principle of federalism has long 
been established under the Tenth Amendment, which provides that 
states, not the federal government, shall have the exclusive province over 
the “police powers”; that is, it is the sole responsibility of state and local 
governments to regulate conduct that they find detrimental to public 
health, safety, or morals. If it were not so, where would the line be 
drawn? If lawmakers were to determine that it is not morally offensive to 
appear nude in a public place, then would they draw the line at deciding 
that engaging in sexual acts in public is unacceptable? Or acts of 
brutality? Or violence? The ultimate issue is not whether states, the 
traditional holders of the police power, have the right to regulate conduct 
on moral grounds. The question is where should these lawmakers draw 
the line, and what conduct will and will not be deemed acceptable? At 
the present time it seems clear that public nudity is a practice that state 
and local legislators are not ready to condone. 
While some cases have admittedly held that conduct can equal 
expression in some contexts, and it is indisputable that literally any 
 
 80. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568. 
 81. Id. at 569. 
 82. LeRoy v. Sidley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1664). 
 83. Brief of Amicus Curiae states of Kansas, Ohio, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and the Commonwealths of 
Pennsylvania and Virginia in support of Petitioners, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (1999) 
(No. 98-1161) (Appendix A-1 – shows a list of statutes by state.) 
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conduct can be engaged in for the purpose of communicating some point 
of view,84 no rational person could argue that the government should be 
stripped of all power to regulate socially offensive conduct merely 
because it might incidentally take away the right to expression in those 
few instances in which a legitimate message could be identified. Those 
who would argue for a First-Amendment treatment of conduct such as 
public nudity seek to cloud the real issue, which is that our government 
owes a duty to pass and enforce laws that uphold the traditional mores of 
society. Again, all conduct involves some measure of expression, but 
once a mode of conduct has been held unacceptable by society, is there 
really a need to craft exceptions for those who claim they engaged in the 
prohibited conduct to make a point? Should some murders be excused 
because they are politically motivated? Should theft be justified when it 
is committed to protest against the wealthy establishment? Certainly not. 
And similarly, there should be no further explanation needed for 
enforcing a general prohibition of nudity, another form of conduct for 
which society holds contempt. Nowhere in the United States Constitution 
is there a passage that states that individuals may do whatever they 
please. The First Amendment states only that each citizen may say 
whatever she pleases. It is left to the states and local governments, under 
the Tenth Amendment, to determine what standards of conduct will be 
considered appropriate in their own communities. 
Had burning paper in public been an act that society agreed was 
unacceptable, as public nudity is, the O’Brien Court would not have had 
to engage in a First Amendment analysis. But such is not the case. The 
law that was broken in O’Brien was a law against burning draft cards, 
which is not a morally unacceptable act in and of itself and cannot be 
argued to fall under the traditional police powers. Thus some further 
analysis was necessary. Unfortunately, O’Brien has since been 
improperly extended to situations where it is not needed, such as these 
cases dealing with public nudity. And this extension must be stopped, as 
the Supreme Court warned in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick: “The law . . . 
is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing 
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the [First 
Amendment as applied through the] Due Process Clause, the courts will 
be very busy indeed.”85 
 
 84. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1989) (“It is possible to find some 
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes – for example, walking down the 
street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall – but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the 
activity within the protection of the First Amendment”). 
 85. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
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But busy courts are not the only consequence of such a state of the 
law. Indeed, if all laws “representing moral choices,” which are nothing 
new to the law, were to be invalidated by any means, the free-for-all that 
would ensue would deteriorate the very walls of modern, civilized 
society. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. created a great deal of confusion when 
it was decided in 1991 because the Court chose to employ a First-
Amendment analysis to a general, conduct-based law, and left lower 
courts and local legislators with a fragmented, plurality opinion that 
provided little guidance for future resolution of similar issues. When the 
issue of the validity of a general public nudity law nearly identical to the 
one addressed in Barnes came up again in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
Barnes’s plurality opinion and its piecemeal First-Amendment analysis 
offered no such guidance, and the issue was again tried all the way to the 
United States Supreme Court. Yet, faced with a second chance to resolve 
the same issue, the Court dropped the ball again and once again failed to 
establish a clear and applicable rule, again getting caught up in an 
unnecessary First-Amendment analysis and producing a broken plurality 
opinion. 
The solution to this inability of the Court to craft a clear and defined 
rule on the issue of public nudity laws is to realize that such laws, if 
general in their scope and applicable to the conduct of nudity in any 
public place, are not governed by First Amendment principles at all. 
Rather, they are conduct-based prohibitions of morally unacceptable 
conduct that are justified by the traditional role of state and local 
governments, which is to apply the police powers to ensure public 
morality, health, and safety. Public nudity and indecency have long been 
considered by society and by the common law to be unacceptable and 
pernicious conduct. 
Ultimately, every legislative body faced with the issue of indecency 
and public nudity must weigh the need to uphold public standards of 
morality, safety, and health (through application of the police powers) 
against inconvenience caused by a general ban on conduct such as 
nudity. Simplifying the test in this manner, in keeping with the reality 
that nudity itself is not speech, would allow local lawmakers to address 
the specific needs of their own communities, would save judicial and 
legislative time and resources, and would also establish a clear and 
understandable precedent for future decisions. This is the position 
advocated by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion to City of Erie, in 
which he echoed many of his earlier warnings from Barnes. 
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Until the Court recognizes that the First Amendment offers no 
protection for pernicious conduct such as public nudity whether or not 
accompanied by some type of expression, and that prohibitions on those 
forms of conduct considered by society to be morally unacceptable are a 
valid exercise of the police power, issues like public nudity will continue 
to take up an inordinate amount of time and judicial resources, and local 
and state lawmakers will remain in the dark as to what they may and 
should do with regard to the regulation of such conduct. 
Aaron Brogdon 
 
